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In 2002, Kashmir once again virtually led the two countries, India and Pakistan, to 
another war. And this time the fear was that it could even escalate into a nuclear 
war. Had it not been for the enormous pressure built upon both the states by the 
international community, most notably the United States, the matters could have 
gone out of hand. But the problem of deep distrust with which both the states seem 
to be congenitally afflicted still remains. Drawing upon historical sources and 
current politics, the article explores the recognition of the line of control that 
separates India controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir from the areas under 
Pakistani control as a possible solution to this vexed issue. 
 
THE BACKDROP 
 
In 1996, following the parliamentary and assembly elections held in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, in June and September, respectively, notwithstanding 
conflicting  reports  about  their fairness,2  it seemed that that round too had gone in 
                                                 
1 Partha S. Ghosh is currently a Director at the Indian Council of Social Science Research, 
New Delhi. 
2 Two kinds of views were expressed in the Indian press after the parliamentary election 
held in June 1996, one, that the election was a farce as the security forces had coerced the 
people to vote, and two, that there was spontaneous response on the part of the people to 
participate in the election which was reflected in the turn out of voters, though small. 
Representing the first view were Harinder Baweja, ‘Voting Under Coercion,’ India Today 
(New Delhi), 15 June 1996, pp. 68-70; and Shiraz Sidhva, ‘Guns and Votes: A Loss of 
Credibility,’ Frontline (Madras), 14 June 1996, pp. 122-25. Representing the second view 
were Pravin Swami, ‘A Surprise in Kashmir: The Myth of Coercion at Large,’ ibid, pp. 
114-20; Aarati Dhar, ‘A Vote for Peace,’ The Hindu (New Delhi), 9 June 1996; and Prem 
Shankar Jha, ‘A New Start in Kashmir,’ ibid., 16 June 1996. The assessment of the then 
Chief Election Commissioner of India, T.N. Seshan, was: ‘I cannot unequivocally say there 
was no coercion…. Given various factors, including the neighbouring country’s 
determination to disrupt the elections, we have conducted as good an election under the 
circumstances.’  He  said  that  some  voters  could  have  charged  the  security  forces with 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
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favour of India. Actually it was after a gap of nine years that the assembly elections 
were held in the state. Ever since independence it was the third time that Pakistan 
seemed to lose out to India in its effort to wrest the valley from the latter.3 On 
earlier occasions, in 1947 and 1965, these efforts were military in nature but from 
the late eighties onwards there was a change in tactics. Through overt intervention 
Pakistan had created a state of insurgency and waged a low cost low intensity 
undeclared war through a band of terrorists trained by its intelligence agency, the 
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).4 The strategy was to make things difficult for 
India and it was expected that under unabated pressure India’s nerves would 
eventually wreck. When that stage would be reached then at that point through the 
expedience of an international conference the fate of Kashmir would be decided. 
Whatever be the outcome of that international conference, it would at least change 
the status quo, and any change in the status quo whatsoever would be to Pakistan’s 
relative advantage. 
 It was against this background that the elections of 1996 seemed to make India 
somewhat hopeful about the better days to come. There were indeed some visible 
improvements in the ground realities and tourist flow, though limited, restarted. 
But as things stand now all these hopes have been proved to be momentary. The 
state is preparing for its next assembly election in September 2002 but in the mean 
time so many things have gone wrong that one wonders whether the elections 
would actually alter those realities for the better. In the first place, the India-
Pakistan relationship has touched its nadir once again. Ever since May 1998, both 
the nations have formally gone nuclear. But that probably did not do all that harm 
for even after that they have sat across the table to discuss matters of mutual 
concern. Actually things were improving as was reflected in the Indo-Pak Summit 
of 1999. But the hope that was created by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s 
visit to Pakistan in February 1999 and the signing of the Lahore Declaration on the 
21st of the month was dashed to the ground by Pakistan’s Kargil adventure of May 
1999. Then there was further intensification of Jehadi terrorism, evidently 
sponsored by the ISI, which culminated in the most dramatic and daring assault on 
the parliament of India on 13 December 2001. To India’s advantage was the 
intervening momentous development of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, 
which put Pakistan under tremendous pressure, particularly from the United States, 
                                                 
‘coercing’ them to cast their ballot in fear of retribution from the militants. See Times of 
India (New Delhi), 5 June 1996. After the assembly elections held in September 1996 there 
was not much of a controversy about the fairness of the poll and all except the All Party 
Hurriyat Conference (APHC), which opposed the poll, seemed to accept the verdict that 
went in favour of the National Conference led by Farooq Abdullah. 
3 The five-member American study team that visited India and Pakistan during March-May 
1997 under the auspices of the U.S.-based Kashmir Study Group seemed to corroborate this 
impression. Kashmir Study Group, 1947-1997: The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting 
Paths to Peace: Report on the Visit of an Independent Study Team to India and Pakistan 
(New York, September 1997), pp. 7-8. 
4 Between 1988 and 1998 there were about 39,000 Pakistan-sponsored terrorist incidents in 
J&K compared to only 5,000 in the rest of the world. B. Raman, ‘Pakistan-Sponsored 
Terrorism in J&K,’ South Asian Analysis Group, Paper No. 192 
(http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper192.htm). 
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virtually making it commit itself to desist from aiding and abetting international 
terrorism that included its activities in Kashmir. President Pervez Musharraf’s 
nation wide broadcast on 12 January 2002 marked a significant departure from 
what the Pakistani state thought and did for Islamic Jehadis heretofore. How far are 
these commitments real and how far are they in response to an existing reality, and 
therefore, temporary, only time would say. But would they solve the Kashmir 
problem—is the moot question. 
 Essentially the problem of Kashmir has two closely inter-related causes which 
the restoration of democratic process or the withdrawal of Pakistan for the time 
being would not be able to eradicate though they may make the Indian government 
complacent at this point of time. If ‘normal times’ return, the problem would 
remain dormant but as soon as the political goings would get tough, which is bound 
to happen periodically in a competitive plural democracy, tough would get the 
going. All complications emanating from those sources would again raise their 
heads. 
 These two causes are: one, the legal status of Kashmir as was to be determined 
according to the instrument of Transfer of Power, and two, the political question of 
governing Kashmir through normal politico-administrative procedures or through 
some special constitutional device. Closely related to the first was the issue 
whether the problem could be settled through negotiations between India and 
Pakistan alone or through the involvement of the United Nations, or, what has been 
happening of late through the involvement of the United States. 
 
THE LEGAL QUESTION: A REINTERPRETATION 
 
To recapitulate the legal question, the original sin was committed by the Maharaja 
of Kashmir, Hari Singh, who procrastinated in making up his mind as to which 
state, India or Pakistan, should he accede to which he was required to do as per the 
instrument of Transfer of Power.5 If one dispassionately goes by the logic of 
partition and analyses the way other states like Hyderabad and Junagarh were 
incorporated into India then one would have to agree that Jammu and Kashmir, at 
least the valley which was predominantly Muslim, should have gone to Pakistan.6 
It was not only a Muslim-majority state, it also fulfilled all other qualifications laid 
down to facilitate a choice in favour of Pakistan, namely, contiguity, 
communication links and economic interdependence. What prevented that from 
                                                 
5 It has, however, been argued that the Maharaja was taking his time so as to ascertain the 
will of his people before the process was overtaken by the Pakistani invasion. See Prem 
Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (Delhi: OUP, 1996), pp. 2-3. The 
British historian Alastair Lamb has argued that even before the instrument of accession was 
signed the Indian troops had landed in Kashmir. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed 
Legacy, 1884-1990 (Hertsfordbury: Roxford, 1991). 
6 Theoretically both India and Pakistan have subscribed to double standards in respect of 
accession of princely states. Following the logic of its action in Hyderabad and Junagarh 
India should not have minded the Pakistani action in sending raiders to Kashmir. Similarly, 
in the perspective of its demographic logic in Kashmir Pakistan should not have questioned 
Indian moves in Hyderabad and Junagarh. See Eqbal Ahmad, ‘A Kashmiri Solution for 
Kashmir,’ Himal South Asia (Kathmandu), 9(8), November-December 1996, p. 19. 
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happening was Maharaja’s decision not to do so coupled with Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
emotional attachment to the state as he happened to be a Kashmiri Pandit.7 
 There was indeed a strategic dimension too, which Nehru as a foreign policy 
expert must not have overlooked. Just prior to his acceptance of the accession of 
Kashmir he had sent a telegram to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
which read: 
 
We have received urgent appeal of assistance from Kashmir 
Government. We would be disposed to give favourable consideration 
to such request from any friendly State. Kashmir’s Northern frontiers, 
as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, 
Afghanistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. 
Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon control of internal 
tranquillity and existence of stable Government, is vital to security of 
India especially since part of Southern boundary of Kashmir and India 
are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is an obligation of national 
interest to India. We are giving urgent consideration to question as to 
what assistance we can give to State to defend it. 
It should be made clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this 
emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede 
to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the 
question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be 
decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this 
view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression of will of 
people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in 
imperilling integrity of its territory.8 
 
It is generally believed in India that behind India’s Kashmir policy there is the 
broad rationale of India’s nation-building ideal of ‘one nation’ upon which the 
entire freedom movement was built. On the same ground its conflict with Pakistan, 
a state based on the Muslim League’s two-nation theory, is explained. As an 
extension of the argument it is alleged that Pakistan’s quest for nationhood would 
remain incomplete so long as it failed to incorporate Kashmir in its territory for the 
existence of a Muslim-majority province in India makes a mockery of its two-
nation theory. The argument is of doubtful validity for then the very creation of 
Pakistan should have been objected to and should have been actually prevented at 
any political cost, which Mahatma Gandhi had suggested. He went to the extent of 
pleading for the name of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the prime minister of the 
                                                 
7 It is said that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Minister of States, to whom goes largely the 
credit of inclusion of princely states in India, most notably Hyderabad and Junagarh, had 
virtually written off Kashmir following the logic of the partition. It was Nehru who had 
some kind of a ‘pathological’ passion for Kashmir to which reference was made by Lord 
Mountbatten in one of his official reports. See M.J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale (New 
Delhi: Viking/Penguin, 1991), p. 95. 
8 Dhirendra Sharma, ed., India’s Commitment of Kashmir (Political Analysis with 
Documents) (New Delhi: Philosophy and Social Action Publication, 1994), p. 35. 
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undivided India just to avoid partition of the country. The nation-building logic is 
the post-facto explanation of an essentially legal dispute.9 
When the princely states were offered the option of either merging into India or 
Pakistan all of them were not necessarily influenced by these one-nation/two-
nation considerations. The princes were mere mortals as was expected of them and 
wanted the best out of a bad bargain. For Kashmir’s Hari Singh the choice was 
neither a Hindu-majority India nor a Muslim-majority Pakistan. He simply wanted 
to retain his independence. Similar was the case with the Muslim Nawab of 
Bhopal. His fate, however, was sealed because of the geographical handicap of his 
state. The princely state of Tranvancore not only proclaimed it decision to remain 
independent, it went to the extent of signing a trade agreement with Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah. Maharaja Hanwant Singh of the Hindu-majority state of Jodhpur had 
virtually made up his mind to accede to Pakistan.10 
 But the legal question was overtaken when Pakistan committed the first illegal 
act by violating the instrument of Transfer of Power. It invaded Kashmir to incite 
an internal Muslim rebellion against the Hindu Maharaja probably on the line of 
the Indian action in Hyderabad. India contributed to this illegality of Pakistan by 
agreeing to hold a plebiscite to decide about the political fate of Kashmir although 
the Maharaja had signed the instrument of accession on 26 October 1947 in favour 
of India. For reasons easily explainable but otherwise politically short-sighted (the 
popularity of Sheikh Abdullah in the state and his pro-India posture) both Lord 
Mountbatten and Jawaharlal Nehru unsuccessfully converted that legally complete 
accession into a conditional one. In his letter to the Maharaja dated 27 October 
1947 Mountbatten wrote that ‘my Government have decided to accept the 
accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy 
that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of 
dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes 
of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that as soon as law and order 
have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of 
the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.’11 On the same 
day Nehru sent a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
stating, inter alia, that ‘our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the 
question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in 
accordance with the wishes of people and we adhere to this view.’12 The italicised 
                                                 
9 For a critical evaluation of Nehru’s Kashmir policy in all its dimensions, see Subrata K. 
Mitra, ‘Nehru’s Policy towards Kashmir: Bringing Politics Back Again,’ in Justus Richter 
and Christian Wagner, eds., Regional Security, Ethnicity and Governance: The Challenges 
for South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998), pp. 32-48. 
10 Akbar, Kashmir, pp. 99-100. 
11 For the text of the letter, see Sharma, India’s Commitment to Kashmir, pp. 35-36. 
Emphasis added. According to a recent study, the British did not want the entire J&K to go 
to India. The partition of the state between India and Pakistan was what it wanted. C. 
Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir (New Delhi: Sage, 2002). 
12 Excerpts of the telegram in ibid., p. 36. Emphasis added. This pledge was reiterated by 
Nehru in his telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan on 3 November 1947. 
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phrases above show that these expressions were neither Pakistan’s nor UN’s 
creation but they were India’s own creation. 
 Following this it was once again Pakistan’s turn to contribute to the intractable 
character of the conflict. It failed to grab the opportunity and settle the problem 
once and for all by not adhering to the UN resolutions. The Resolution 47 (21 April 
1948), which provided for the plebiscite, expected from Pakistan a total withdrawal 
of all Pakistanis from Kashmir. ‘When it is established to the satisfaction of the 
[UN] Commission … that the tribesmen [from Pakistan] are withdrawing and that 
arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, [India 
should] put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for 
withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them 
progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power 
in the maintenance of law and order.’13 The primary responsibility, therefore, 
rested with Pakistan to withdraw its troops but it did not oblige. Naturally, the UN 
resolutions could not be implemented nor the plebiscite held. A decade later, 
Gunnar Jarring, the UN Representative opined that the passage of time and the 
changing circumstances had rendered the UN resolutions obsolete.14 
 India followed a different logic to underscore the irrelevance of the plebiscite 
formula. On 27 October 1950, the General Council of the National Conference 
adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for 
the purpose of determining the ‘future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir.’ The Constituent Assembly consisting of 75 members was elected in 
1950 by a universal adult franchise and the constitution that was adopted declared 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be ‘an integral part of India.’ It may, however, 
be noted that in the election, all the nominations filed by the opposition were 
rejected.15 Whatever be the case, the government of India expressed the view that 
as the democratic process followed for the election of the legislative assembly of 
the state proved that the people had accepted to remain within the Union of India 
the UN resolutions on plebiscite ‘had become obsolete and were no longer binding 
on India.’16 It was forgotten that the disputed territory was entire J&K while the 
Constituent Assembly and the Legislative Assembly in question were elected only 
by the people of India-controlled part and not those in the Pakistan-controlled part. 
It is obvious that from the very beginning India had reconciled itself to the reality 
of a divided J&K, a point to which we would come back later in the paper. 
 The Indo-Pak war of 1965, which Pakistan initiated to capture Kashmir once 
again underlined its lack of respect for the UN resolutions. In 1972, the UN 
                                                 
13 Resolution 47 (1948) on the India-Pakistan question submitted jointly by the 
Representatives for Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America and adopted by the Security Council at its 286th meeting held on 
21 April 1948. (Document No. S/726, dated 21st April 1948.) Text in ibid., pp. 4-8. 
14 See B.G. Verghese, ‘Kashmir: Freedom and Its Discontents,’ Hindustan Times (New 
Delhi), 24 June 2000. 
15 Arun Joshi, ‘A Long History of Rigged Elections,’ Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 19 
May 2002. 
16 Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1963-15 July 1964. G.A.O.R.: XIX Session, 
Supplement No. 2 (A/5802), p. 88. 
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resolutions got superseded when both India and Pakistan signed the Simla 
Agreement, which laid down that the problem of Kashmir would be solved 
bilaterally through peaceful means and the Line of Control (LOC) would be the de-
facto boundary between the two countries.17 It must, however, be understood here 
that the Simla Agreement did not address itself to the legal question of sovereign 
right over Kashmir; it merely eliminated the role of external powers in the 
controversy.18 
 The very fact that the LOC was accepted as the de-facto boundary till the fate 
of Kashmir—both the Indian as well as the Pakistani parts—was finally decided 
through negotiations ipso facto acknowledged the legal controversy over title in 
respect of the state although India continued to claim that the accession was 
complete and as such irrevocable. Otherwise how could one explain that India, that 
too a victor in the war of 1971, should have agreed to a situation in which a part of 
its sovereign territory could continue to remain in the indefinite occupation of an 
‘enemy’ nation.19 Remember that all Indian maps show the entire J&K as part of 
India and the Government of India does not use, whenever there is any reference to 
Kashmir, any other phrase than that the state is an integral part of India which is 
just not negotiable. Did not the Government of India agree to negotiate the subject? 
The fact of the matter, therefore, is that the legal question of title over Kashmir is 
still open and as such is very much negotiable and should, therefore, remain so on 
the Indo-Pak agenda. 
 
                                                 
17 Clause 4(ii) of the Simla Agreement read: ‘In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control 
resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides without 
prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it 
unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further 
undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.’ For the full 
text of the Agreement, see D.D. Khanna and Kishore Kumar, Dialogue of the Deaf: The 
India-Pakistan Divide (New Delhi: Konark, 1992), pp. 194-95. 
18 This, however, has been the Indian interpretation. Pakistan never subscribed to this. 
During the ratification debate in the Pakistan National Assembly immediately after the 
signing of the Agreement Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto categorically stated that Pakistan’s Kashmir 
policy was not at all compromised; on the contrary, he had reactivated the Kashmir 
question. He clarified that Pakistan was not debarred from raising the issue at the UN for 
the UN Charter took precedence over any bilateral agreement. See V.P. Dutt, India’s 
Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vani, 1984), p. 159. It may be relevant here to note that there 
are evidences of India too trying to register the support of external powers on Kashmir 
related matters. In February 1992, when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
planned to send thousands of its volunteers to cross over the LOC (Pakistan did not permit 
it) the Government of India took into confidence the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council through their respective ambassadors in New Delhi in way of seeking 
their good offices to defuse the crisis. For details, see Partha S. Ghosh, ‘Playing with 
Brinkmanship,’ Financial Express (New Delhi), 16 February 1992. 
19 It is argued that under superpower pressure the borders of West Pakistan (including 
POK) could not be altered. Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States 
for 20 years, however, writes that it was India itself, which refrained from attacking West 
Pakistan during the Bangladesh war. This was communicated to the United States by the 
Soviets to considerable relief of the former. See Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New 
York: Times Book, 1995), pp. 142-43. 
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THE POLITICAL QUESTION: WHY SPECIAL STATUS? 
 
Like the legal question the political question too was not adequately addressed by 
India. Even after the state had duly acceded to India it was not treated the way 
other princely states were treated. Nor is it treated even now the way other states of 
the Indian Union are treated. No wonder that some states are now asking for the 
same status like that of the J&K. In Tamil Nadu the D.M.K. president and the 
former chief minister M. Karunanidhi virtually threatened that if the status given to 
Kashmir was not granted to other states ‘we may have to meet the situation where 
there will be several Kashmirs.’20 
 Kashmir had its separate Constituent Assembly, which drafted its own 
constitution and the inclusion of the state in the Indian Union had to be approved 
by its Legislative Assembly. Although there are some other states in India which 
too have special rights as provided by the Constitution of India (Articles 371A to 
371I) yet Article 370, which deals with Kashmir, is qualitatively different. Even 
after a half-a-century of J&K’s accession to India the title of the article continues to 
be: ‘Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’. Only 
the word ‘transitional’ was deleted from the original title with effect from 1 
December 1963 through an amendment. 
 As a result even now the National Conference (NC) talks about the Nehru-
Sheikh Abdullah agreement (better known as the Delhi Agreement) of June 1952, 
which had underwritten the special status.21 On 26 June 2000, the J&K Assembly 
passed a resolution to go back to the status quo of 1952. Leading the debate on 
behalf of the ruling NC, Farooq Abdullah, the Chief Minister of the state and the 
President of the party, strongly reiterated the pledge that he had made to the people 
of the state during the September 1996 assembly elections that if elected his party 
would restore the pre-1953 status. He said that it was this sort of denial of rights 
that had pushed Jinnah to demand partition of India. He clarified that the accession 
of his state to the Indian Union was complete but that did not mean that the Indian 
state should not honour its commitment to the autonomy of J&K enshrined in the 
so-called Delhi Agreement. Earlier also Abdullah had asked Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao to consider promulgation of a Presidential Order under Article 
370(1)(2) to restore autonomy to J&K in terms of that agreement. But the 
government was not willing to go beyond the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah 
                                                 
20 Times of India, 30 January 1996. 
21 There was no formal agreement. There were discussions between Nehru and Sheikh 
Abdullah following which both made statements to the Indian parliament and Kashmir 
assembly respectively about the outcome of the talks. Although this so-called Agreement 
mentioned that the state would enjoy autonomy barring three subjects, namely, foreign 
affairs, defence and communication, since it also mentioned that all the erstwhile princely 
states acceding to India retained these subjects to start with, underlined the impermanence 
of the autonomy which the NC talks about. For a summary of the Agreement, see Saifuddin 
Soz, ed., Why Autonomy to Kashmir? (New Delhi: India Centre of Asian Studies, 1995), 
pp. 140-42. See also the autobiography of Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar: An 
Autobiography (Abridged, translated from Urdu and introduced by Kushwant Singh) (New 
Delhi: Penguin, 1993), p. 116. 
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agreement of 1975.22 As the demand was not heeded the party had stayed away 
from the parliamentary elections held in June 1996. It may be argued that it was 
actually the fear of the gun of the militants that influenced the NC’s decision not to 
participate for after seeing that the Indian state was powerful enough to conduct the 
polls even in the teeth of violent provocations from the terrorists the party 
mellowed its position. Even without extracting any commitment from the Indian 
government with regard to the Delhi Agreement the party participated in the 
assembly elections held only two months later, in September 1996. 
 It may be surmised that had the NC failed to make it to power in September 
1996 there was every likelihood of its revamping the autonomy demand more 
seriously immediately afterwards. Autonomy, read in the context of NC politics 
has a special meaning in the valley, which should not be overlooked.23 In the 
present phase, the immediate provocation to take up the issue could be the NDA 
government’s move to rope in the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to the 
negotiating table to the considerable discomfiture of the NC. Even the newly 
anointed chief of the party, Omar Abdullah, Farooq Abdullah’s son and the high-
profile Minister of State for External Affairs in Vajpayee’s Council of Ministers, 
has started harping the same tune. There is no reason that the Vajpayee government 
would oblige the NC. On 4 July 2000 the Vajpayee cabinet had unanimously 
rejected the demand and the same policy would continue.24 The politics of Kashmir 
is a game of checkers between the central government and the NC. In the absence 
of any political space left for the opposition the central government has become 
virtually a hostage to the NC’s manoeuvring. NC knows that quite well. Just by 
shouting from the rooftops that the accession of Kashmir to India is final it takes 
any government in New Delhi, whether it is the NDA or the Congress or the United 
Front, for a ride. If at all there is the slightest indication that the central government 
is trying to create a political space for the forces opposed to the NC the latter rakes 
up the autonomy issue causing shivers to New Delhi for it has larger implications. 
The failure of the Indian state in Kashmir is neither diplomatic nor military. It is 
political. 
                                                 
22 M.K Narayan, ‘How Free is My Valley: Needed a New Look at Kashmir,’ Asian Age 
(New Delhi), 25 December 1995. See also, Navneeta Chadha Behera, ‘J&K (&L &D 
&G…): Making and Unmaking Identities,’ Himal South Asia (Kathmandu), 9(8), 
November-December 1996, p. 29. For the text of the so-called Indira Gandhi-Sheikh 
Abdullah accord of 1975, actually signed by Mirza Afzal Beg and G. Parthasarathi, see 
M.L. Kotru, The Kashmir Story (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External 
Affairs, n.d.), pp. 81-82. 
23 I recall here one of my earlier impressions in this regard made in the aftermath of the 
1983 assembly elections. Had the NC lost that election there was possibility of plebiscite 
demand again raised. See Partha S. Ghosh and Indra Ghosh, ‘Some Reflections on Kashmir 
Politics,’ Mainstream (New Delhi), 9 July 1983, pp. 31-33. 
24 The demand for autonomy was on the cards for quite some time though. After winning 
the September 1996 assembly elections, Farooq Abdullah, with the approval of his cabinet 
constituted on 29 November 1996 a nine-member committee to examine and recommend 
measures for the restoration of autonomy. A 184-page report of the committee was released 
in April 1999. Originally Dr. Karan Singh was the chairman of the committee but on his 
resignation on 31 July 1997, Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Shah, PWD Minister in the Abdullah 
cabinet, became its chairman. 
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LACK OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
 
The question of special status is ever shrouded in political controversy. According 
to Sheikh Abdullah even Nehru had misgivings about it and had some sympathy 
with Jammu’s Praja Parishad and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, both of which were in 
favour of full merger of the state to the Indian Union. But on account of the UN’s 
possible adverse reaction to it and the Hindu communal overtone in the demand 
Nehru did not support the move.25 At the moment there is no national consensus in 
the country on the question. Although the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is 
ever critical of it and so is the opposition Congress, there are elements within the 
ruling NDA coalition that are in favour of continuation of Article 370 and even 
more powers to J&K. Even the BJP now seems to be in favour of more powers to 
the state without of course tampering with the special status clause enshrined in the 
Article 370. The Indian Muslim position on the matter is somewhat ambivalent. 
The Kashmiri Muslims are a separate ethnic group and other Indian Muslims have 
little to do with them. On the contrary they feel that it is for these Kashmiris who 
are better looked after than them that the Indian Muslims earn a bad name as anti-
national. Incidentally, the only person who opposed the granting of special status to 
J&K during the Constituent Assembly debates was Maulana Hasrat Mohani, a 
prominent non-Kashmiri Indian Muslim.26 
 Over the years there has been considerable erosion in the autonomy element 
contained in the Article 370. This has been recounted by none other than the BJP 
itself. The National Executive Meeting of the party held at Bangalore on 17 June 
1993 noted the following; 
The permit system for the entry of the Indian people into the state and similar 
permit system for the state people going to other parts of the country have been 
abolished. 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, Jurisdiction of the Election 
Commission of India, and the Jurisdiction of the Auditor General of India have also 
been extended to J&K. 
There has been financial integration, which resulted in flow of more central 
assistance to the state. 
Customs duty which is imposed for import of foreign goods, was abolished as 
it was against the spirit of oneness of the country. 
There has been integration of the services and many people of the state have 
found place in the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.), the Indian Police Service 
(I.P.S.), the Indian Foreign Service (I.F.S.) and other cadres and many officers 
from outside the state got opportunity to serve in this state like other parts of the 
country. 
The system of nomination of members from the state to the Lok Sabha (the 
Lower House of Parliament) has been replaced by direct elections like other parts 
of the country. 
                                                 
25 Abdullah, Flames of Chinar, p. 118; Chadha, ‘J&K,’ p. 29. 
26 Maroof Raza, Wars and No Peace over Kashmir (New Delhi: Lancer, 1996), pp. 20-21. 
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The nomenclature of the Sadar-e-Riyasat and that of the Prime Minister have been 
changed to Governor and the Chief Minister, respectively, as is the case in other 
states.27 
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution has been extended to J&K also. (The 
article, which is even otherwise controversial, empowers the centre to declare 
Governor’s Rule in the state.) 
Over 50 central labour laws have been extended to the state. 
By constantly harping upon the special status clause the BJP while in the 
opposition seemingly wanted to prevent any retardation of the process. Of course, 
it attributed all this to the ‘supreme sacrifice’ of its founder, Syama Prasad 
Mookerjee, and said that ‘going back to 1952-53 means retarding of all these 
steps.’28 The party regretted that ‘though Article 370 was intended to be temporary 
and transient, and that though earlier even Pandit Nehru had apologetically spoken 
of its “gradual erosion,” the present [Rao] government has now chosen to refer to it 
as a “solemn commitment” to the people of Kashmir…. It creates a psychological 
barrier between Kashmir and the rest of India. It gives indirect legitimacy to the 
two-nation theory.’29 It also gives a handle to Pakistan to argue that India has been 
able to retain Kashmir only by granting it a special status.30 
All this, however, had its roots in the pre-independence Kashmir politics. The 
Indian National Congress had accepted the role of Kashmiris as an autonomous 
political group and the relationship between the Congress and the NC was one of 
active cooperation. When Jinnah tried to woo the Kashmiri Muslims and sell his 
two-nation theory Sheikh Abdullah vehemently denounced it and virtually chased 
the Muslim League leader out of the valley. There was so much of unity of purpose 
between the two organisations that both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru felt 
that there was no need of having a Congress organization in the state. It was on 
account of this legacy that when Kashmir acceded to India the NC was allowed to 
play a major role in working out the details of the merger. The fact that Kashmir 
was given a special status underlined the point that its people were treated 
somewhat differently from those belonging to other states although there were 
similar demands from several other areas at the time of independence.31 
                                                 
27 The autonomy resolution passed on 26 June 2000 asked for the restoration of these 
nomenclatures.  
28 Bharatiya Janata Party Publication No. 129 (New Delhi, n.d.), p. 4. It may be noted that a 
railway project was conceived some time ago to link Srinagar with Jammu. The Jammu-
Udhampur section was not merely an essential component of the Jammu-Srinagar rail link, 
but it assumed significance as Udhampur was the headquarters of the Indian Army’s 
Northern Command and also a major business and trade centre. Times of India, 15 February 
1994. 
29 Bharatiya Janata Party, National Executive Meeting, 13, 14 and 15 March 1992, Sarnath, 
Varanasi (New Delhi), p. 10. See also, Jagmohan, ‘Autonomy for Kashmir,’ Hindustan 
Times, 14, 15 and 16 August 1996. Jagmohan, now a BJP MP and a cabinet minister in the 
Vajpayee government, was earlier the Governor of J&K. 
30 Raza, Wars and No Peace Over Kashmir, p. 21. 
31 The Akalis in Punjab, the Naga National Council in Nagaland, the United Mizo Freedom 
Organisation in Mizoram, the All Assam Tribes and Races Federation in the then united 
Assam, etc. had all demanded special status in the Indian Union, if not total independence. 
For details, see Partha S. Ghosh, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Management: The Indian 
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This understanding, however, came under strain before long. Under the shadow of 
a growing rift between India and Pakistan, which got entangled in the larger Cold 
War question and the US strategic interests in the region Sheikh Abdullah toyed 
with the idea of an independent Kashmir. He even broached the subject with the 
Americans. This was not appreciated by New Delhi. Sheikh Abdullah was put in 
prison for his anti-national activities and an alternative NC leadership was created 
which could be more amenable to the influence of the centre. Till 1965, when the 
Congress organization was set up in Kashmir, NC under the leadership of Bakshi 
Gulam Mohammad enjoyed an associate status of the Indian National Congress. 
The challenge for the Indian state, therefore, should be as to how to do away 
with the special status to the extent that every now and then the leaders from the 
state do not talk of going back to the 1952 situation. At the administrative level 
there is a constant intrusion into the state’s special status but at the political level 
there is ever a hesitation to withdraw the deal. Importance of autonomy for the 
constituent states of a federation cannot be overemphasized but the level of 
autonomy should be uniform; there should not be any first-among-the-equals. 
 
INDIAN EQUIVOCATION? 
 
On the face of provocative action on the part of Kashmiri militants and their 
Pakistani supporters, India often comes across as willing to strike but afraid to 
wound. Indian behaviour can perhaps be attributed to a sense of guilt on the 
Kashmir issue which is reflected in its handling of both the legal and the political 
issues. It is also reflected in the somewhat unnecessary pampering of the state. It is 
the Union finances that provide the entire funds for the state’s five-year plans and 
also for a substantial part of the non-plan expenditure. As per India’s planned 
outlay for 1994-95 the largest recipient of financial allocation of Rs. 45.62 billion 
was Uttar Pradesh with a population of 150 million. That means that the per capita 
allocation was Rs. 304.13. Compared to this J&K received Rs. 9.5 billion for a 
population of eight million, a per capita allocation of Rs. 1187.5. This was higher 
than any other state in the Indian Union. The state was the least taxed by the 
Central government compared to other states and 78 per cent of its total receipts 
were financed by New Delhi.32 According to the Reserve Bank of India the per 
capita central assistance for 1994-95 was Rs. 3,010 for J&K as against Rs. 190 for 
Bihar, Rs. 305 for Tamil Nadu, Rs. 385 for Rajasthan and Rs. 341 for U.P. In the 
case of J&K, 90 per cent of this assistance was in the shape of grants and 10 per 
cent as loans; while for the above mentioned four states it was 30 per cent grants 
and 70 per cent loans. Likewise the per capita non-plan grants for J&K in the same 
year was Rs. 720 while it was 72 for Bihar, Rs. 23 for Tamil Nadu, Rs. 81 for 
Rajasthan and Rs. 23 for U.P.33 The partiality shown in favour of J&K is reflected 
in the plan allocation for 2002-03 as well. In spite of the objection of the Planning 
                                                                                                                            
Case,’ ICES Pamphlet Series 2 (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 
1996), pp. 5-10. 
32 Raza, Wars and No Peace Over Kashmir, p. 100. 
33 Jagmohan, ‘Nuts and Bolts of Operational Reality,’ Hindustan Times, 16 August 1996.  
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Commission of India and the Finance Ministry the Prime Minister personally 
intervened to allocate whatever Farooq Abdullah had demanded, that is, Rs. 22 
billion. It may be noted that in 2001-02 the central allocation was of Rs. 20.5 
billion but the state could spend Rs. 17 billion only.34 
 There allegedly is an intra-regional angle too to this central partiality. Since it 
is the valley of Kashmir, which is essentially the bone of contention between India 
and Pakistan, it may be compared with the rest of Jammu and Kashmir state, most 
notably the Jammu region. It is the complaint of the people of Jammu that most of 
the central aid is consumed by the developmental projects of the valley although 
the population ratio between the valley and Jammu is more or less the same. It is 
51.95 per cent to 45.83 per cent.35 In 1994-95, the sales tax collection from Jammu 
amounted to Rs. 770 million; the valley’s share was only Rs. 120 million. Income 
Tax collection was almost zero in the valley, though normal in Jammu. Ram Sahai, 
the president of the Jammu Chamber of Commerce, said: ‘It is almost as though we 
are being penalized for being loyal to India, while those who subvert the country 
are rewarded.’36 A 1988 study revealed that while more than 95 per cent of the 
valley’s villages were electrified Jammu’s share was in the tune of 70 per cent.37 
Against this background it is not surprising to note why the 26 June 2000 
resolution of the J&K state assembly for autonomy found no support either in 
Jammu or in Ladakh. On the contrary, they vehemently opposed it. 
 It may not, however, be fully correct to see the economic problem of J&K in 
regional terms. While Srinagar and Jammu districts are relatively developed than 
the rest of the state the hilly districts in all the three regions of Kashmir, Jammu 
and Ladakh are underdeveloped. Actually, according to one study, the ‘intra-
regional dualism has become strong. Geographical, resource endowments and 
technological factors constitute the basic causes of the intra-regional variations. 
Secondary and tertiary economic activities are mainly concentrated in Srinagar and 
Jammu districts. Growth impulses are weak or even absent in other districts. The 
maximum labour force is dependent on primary activities. Long winter months in 
the Kashmir region and some sub-regions in Jammu hinder not only early maturity 
of crops but cause large scale seasonal unemployment.’38 Moreover, it must not be 
overlooked that during the decade-old militancy in the valley considerable 
economic activity has shifted from the valley to Jammu, which is reflected in its 
growing construction industry. In contrast, the apparent prosperity of the valley 
                                                 
34 The Hindu, 15 June 2002. 
35 Calculated from the population estimates of 1991. For detailed district-wise estimates of 
population, see Jammu and Kashmir Government, Planning and Development Department, 
Digest of Statistics 1993-93 (Srinagar, 1995), p. 4. 
36 M.D. Nalapat, ‘A Misstep on the Brink of Victory,’ Times of India, 1 January 1996. For 
some other opinions on the same line expressed by Jammu people, see B.S. Jamwal, ‘The 
Cry of Jammu,’ ibid., 3 April 1996; Hari Om, ‘The Reality in J&K,’ The Hindu, 15 
February 1996. ‘Astonishingly,’ writes Jamwal, ‘the talks concerning J&K are confined to 
the Central leaders on the one hand and the valley leaders including militants on the other. 
As if Jammu and Ladakh were non-existent or not a part of J&K.’ 
37 Raza, Wars and No Peace Over Kashmir, p. 100. 
38 M.L. Misri and M.S. Bhat, Poverty, Planning and Economic Change in Jammu and 
Kashmir (New Delhi: Vikas, 1994), pp. 42-46. 
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could be an optical illusion. One scholar has argued that the presence of the 
security forces has strengthened the petty bourgeoisie. Small traders and 
shopkeepers have directly benefited from this hugely expanded market resulting in 
new shops and booming construction industry.39 
 
A HOLISTIC VIEW 
 
The two points—legal and political—made above cannot be read individually. 
They are parts of a composite problem and, therefore, require a composite policy 
response. At the core of the problem is the efficacy of the instrument of accession 
itself, which India does not seem to have fully internalised even after half a century 
of Kashmir’s accession to India. The fact that the government has to regularly 
announce that the accession was final and that J&K is an integral part of India 
speak of the disputed nature of the claim. 
 The problem of Kashmir is ethnic, demographic, communal, secular, federal, 
strategic, international, and South Asian regional, all rolled into one. Avoiding to 
address the basic question of accession would only complicate matters further 
though there might be occasional respites. The fact that there is a near nuclear 
parity between India and Pakistan presents two diametrically opposite scenarios. 
According to one school this would prevent a total military showdown as it 
happened during the Kargil conflict while the other school, largely represented by 
American strategic thinkers, argues that the conflict between India and Pakistan 
may escalate into a nuclear war, which was actually feared in the first half of 2002. 
Neither of the scenarios is desirable. 
 Absence of war does not mean peace. Ever since the beginning of the Cold 
War in the forties till its end in 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union never 
confronted each other on any war front but still their relations created so much of 
an atmosphere of suspicion that the whole world suffocated. Indo-Pak conflict too, 
at the centre of which is Kashmir, is a cancer in the body politic of South Asian 
regionalism and unless this cancer is treated the future of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can at best serve as a meeting 
point but never as a vehicle of growth for the region. At a time when the world 
economy is fast getting regionalized the South Asian regionalism can lag behind 
only at its own cost. Is it not a pity that when the region is the world’s poorest,40 its 
children so much undernourished, and in the development index its constituents are 
almost near the bottom, the two leading nations of the region are bogged down in 
an everlasting territorial dispute. 
 
                                                 
39 Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, ‘Kashmir Conflict: Secessionist Movement, Mobilization 
and Political Institutions (Review Article),’ Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), 74(4), Winter 
2001-02, p. 571. 
40 According to the World Bank, South Asia is the poorest region in the world, even poorer 
than the sub-Saharan Africa. In 1990, almost 59 per cent of the South Asian population 
consumed less than $30 a month in terms of purchasing power parity. The equivalent share 
of the population was 53 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (28 per cent in Latin America and 
15 per cent in East Asia). The Hindu, 24 June 1996. 
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THE PLEBISCITE OPTION: A PROBABLE BLUEPRINT 
 
Having identified the problem between India and Pakistan to have its most 
essential element in the dispute over Kashmir and that of the latter in the 
instrument of accession together with its antecedents and fallouts the bull has to be 
caught by its horns. Theoretically there cannot be any dispute over the assumption 
that people anywhere have their inherent right to choose their political future and 
this rule equally applies to the people of the undivided J&K, the position that 
Pakistan upholds so seriously. If so, let us see how such a plebiscite can be 
organized.  
 Two points are to be made clear at the outset. One, the plebiscite has to be held 
in the entire J&K as was ruled by the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh. And two, 
neither India nor Pakistan has any role to play in this plebiscite. It has to be 
conducted by a third party acceptable to both India and Pakistan. For the sake of 
developing an argument let us suggest that the third party is SAARC to which both 
India and Pakistan belong. Since Bhutan is not a democracy we exclude it from this 
exercise. Similarly, since the Maldives are a single-party democracy we exclude 
that too. We are now left with only three, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, all 
democracies and all having friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. In the 
best traditions of democracy and fair elections let these states appoint an election 
commission to conduct the plebiscite. 
Again, for the sake of developing the idea further a tentative blueprint of this 
plebiscite plan is presented below. 
There would be an adult franchise in the entire former princely state of J&K in 
which voters would be given a choice to either vote for India or Pakistan. 
All Kashmiri Hindus of the valley, who were on the voters list till they had to 
leave the state in early nineties for security reasons, would also vote through postal 
ballots, if necessary. 
Considering the fact that a momentous decision is being taken by the voters, 
and that too when all may not vote, a simple majority formula would not be 
enough. The winning side, therefore, must get at least 65 per cent of all votes cast. 
Prior to the election there should be a two-year interim regime during which 
the authority of China, India and Pakistan would cease to be operative in their 
respective areas and these authorities would devolve upon the SAARC consisting 
of Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Law and order would 
be the responsibility of the trust administration and strict vigil would have to be 
there to prevent infiltrations from across the border of this reunited J&K. 
During the trusteeship there would be complete freedom of speech and 
expression. The official Indian or Pakistani media would not publish or broadcast 
anything against each other but can certainly highlight what they have done to their 
respective areas under control so as to influence the people of Kashmir to make up 
their minds. 
To ensure that the economies of the concerned areas do not suffer, the old 
economic links with external places would be maintained and accordingly traders 
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from J&K would be allowed to visit different countries including India and 
Pakistan and vice versa. 
For all practical purposes the borders between the Chinese, Indian and 
Pakistani parts would be lifted. Kashmiri Hindus who fled away from the valley 
would be rehabilitated and their lost real estates restored to them. 
The result of the plebiscite as announced by the trust government would be 
final and binding upon all the concerned parties. It would be implemented within 
twelve months from the date of the result. 
 
DOUBTFUL EFFICACY 
 
From the blueprint drawn above it is evident that there are enormous difficulties in 
holding a plebiscite. That too whatever has been conceived above is just a fraction 
of practical bottlenecks. The idea here is to sensitise the champions of the 
plebiscite formula about the enormity of the problem of its implementation. Let 
alone India, even Pakistan, and for that matter China, would not agree to it. It is 
one thing to harp on the plebiscite solution at international diplomatic forums but 
quite another when its nuts and bolts have to put in place. No country in the region 
knows it better than Pakistan itself which could not create a conducive situation for 
a plebiscite in the late forties which the UN had prescribed and India too was not 
averse. 
 It is doubtful whether a plebiscite formula would be welcome even in the 
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).41 From the trends in the POK politics it is 
obvious that there are acute tensions between the pro-independence factions on the 
one hand and those who support the merger of Kashmir to Pakistan on the other. In 
the aftermath of the assembly elections of June 1996 in which the Abdul Qayyum’s 
Muslim Conference was routed these fissures widened. Prior to the election several 
nomination papers were rejected on the ground that the candidates had refused to 
sign declarations pledging absolute faith in the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ and in the 
ideology of ‘accession’ of ‘Azad Kashmir’ to Pakistan. This brought to the fore the 
political controversy over the question of POK’s status in Pakistan. Two points are 
relevant in this connection—one, the political status of ‘Azad Kashmir,’ and two, 
that of the northern areas. So far as ‘Azad Kashmir’ is concerned it is not treated as 
other four states of Pakistan. Constitutionally it is not an integral part of Pakistan 
and its status would be finally decided after the dispute with India is settled. As 
such, there was the insistence of candidates not to sign the above-mentioned 
pledge.42 The parties, which refused to sign the pledge, were, among others, the so-
called ‘nationalist’ groups like Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front 
(JKLF), National Awami Party, National Democratic Party and the National 
Students Federation. The JKLF, the oldest and the most powerful in this lot, 
expressed its opposition to the election. Its leader, Amanullah Khan, said that he 
                                                 
41 For a brief but useful description of the constitutional position of the POK in the 
Pakistani set-up, see Syed Talat Hussain, ‘A Rubber Stamp in Azad Kashmir,’ Himal South 
Asia (Kathmandu), 9(8), November-December 1996, p. 21. 
42 The Hindu, 5 June 1996. 
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would oppose the assembly elections ‘tooth and nail’ the way he opposed the 
parliamentary elections in the Indian part. He accused both India and Pakistan for 
the then state of affairs and said that had the two countries wanted, the issue could 
have been resolved.43 
The Government of Pakistan administers the Northern Areas. But the ‘Azad 
Kashmir’ authorities have often wanted to extend their control to this territory as 
well. The argument is that the Northern Areas was a part of the original principality 
of J&K in 1947. Some time ago the Judiciary of ‘Azad Kashmir’ had decided that 
the Northern Areas could be regarded as an integral part of ‘Azad Kashmir.’ 
 The problem is that just like India’s Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan’s ‘Azad 
Kashmir’ is also equally integrated to Pakistan’s politics. During Benazir Bhutto’s 
rule, the rivalry between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Muslim 
Conference (MC) was very sharp. She had absolutely no trust in the MC leader 
Abdul Qayyum Khan who was allegedly close to the military high command. 
Although Abdul Qayyum Khan said that ‘we should not forget that Azad Kashmir 
was formed on the basis of its accession to Pakistan,’ his earlier statement in 
Washington in mid-1995 that he was ready to accept polls on the Indian side of 
Kashmir as a device to discover authoritative interlocutors for the ultimate 
negotiations44 attracted criticisms as an opportunist who spoke with a forked 
tongue—at one level arguing that ‘Azad Kashmir’ was part of Pakistan while at 
another pledging for the ‘third option.’ Now that Pakistan is ruled by the military, 
the politics of ‘Azad Kashmir’ is muted. 
 The Line of Control separating the two Kashmirs has gained so much 
acceptability in both India and Pakistan that it has virtually become an international 
border. No wonder that when a few years ago the noted Indian journalist, B.G. 
Verghese, talked of a condominium of India and Pakistan to rule a federally united 
Kashmir there was no taker of that otherwise humane formula either in India or in 
Pakistan. Similarly, when the Pakistan High Commissioner to India, Riaz Khokar, 
suggested to his government that let his mission be authorized to grant visas to 
Indian Kashmiris to visit ‘Azad Kashmir’ it was turned down by the Interior 
Ministry on the ground that the High Commission might be taken for a ride by the 
Indian intelligence agency.45 
 So much of political vested interests have been created on both sides of the 
LOC that it is doubtful whether they themselves would be interested in the 
plebiscite. Leave alone the Jammu Hindus or the Ladakhi Buddhists, even the 
Gujjars and Shias of the valley are most unlikely to be interested in a plebiscite. 
That leaves only the Sunnis of the valley and those of the POK who could be 
interested in the exercise. But even among them, so far as the Sunnis of the valley 
are concerned, the NC, the Congress, the Janata Dal, and several other political 
outfits have unequivocally announced that Kashmir’s accession to India is final and 
irrevocable. How can they, therefore, suddenly show an interest in the plebiscite? 
After his victory from Anantnag in the 1996 parliamentary election the Janata Dal 
                                                 
43 Times of India, 13 June 1996. 
44 M.B. Naqvi, ‘Polls of Uncertainty,’ Sunday Times of India, 7 April 1996. 
45 Times of India, 22 June 1996. 
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MP, Maqbool Dar, said: ‘It [militancy] was a lava which has exploded. People are 
now fed up with militants. Don’t drag Pakistan into the issue now. Kashmir will 
always be a part of India.’46 Of course, if a choice is given to the people of the 
valley, and also of those of the POK, there is the possibility that a majority of them 
might prefer total independence to joining either India or Pakistan. But given the 
strategic location and the topography of the region, which is not conducive to 
industrial development, it is not a correct prescription for it would complicate the 
question of regional security further. 
 Then there is the question of return of the Kashmiri Hindus to the valley for 
unless they return the vote has no moral sanctity and the Kashmiriyat has no 
meaning. But it is doubtful whether there would be such a situation in the 
foreseeable future when the Hindus would return. Ever since the early phase of 
Sheikh Abdullah’s regime there have been efforts to provide economic benefits to 
the valley’s Muslims at the cost of the Hindus, may be not with that intention in 
mind. Abdullah’s land reforms were indeed progressive in their orientation. But in 
effect they benefited the Muslim peasantry at the cost of the Hindu landlords. No 
wonder that his popularity swelled overnight. In the present phase, the question is 
that of the Hindu evacuee properties, which are changing to Muslim hands at much 
cheaper price. A return of peace in the valley that would create conducive situation 
for the Hindus to return may not be in the interest of the emerging Muslim middle 
class in the valley.47 Although the J&K government prepared a blueprint for the 
return of the Hindu migrants it remained a dead letter,48 primarily, of course, on 
account of continued violence in the valley. 
 
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL ISLAM 
 
The legal question of title over Kashmir and the views of the Kashmiris themselves 
on their fates, however, have been overshadowed by other factors many of which 
have to do with the phenomena of international terrorism, a resurgent and militant 
Islam and strategic importance of the region. Two developments in the seventies 
contributed significantly to escalation of tensions in Kashmir. One, the power and 
influence gained by some of the Middle Eastern states on account of steep rise in 
the price of crude oil, and two, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. To 
complicate matters were the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 
early nineties and the emergence of several resource-rich, yet politically 
underdeveloped, Muslim states in the Central Asian region as independent nations. 
 Towards the middle of the 1980s Pakistan’s covert involvement in the affairs of 
Kashmir started. It was directly linked to the political turmoil and violence that the 
                                                 
46 Quoted by Gurumukh Singh, ‘Mountains of Dispute,’ Sunday Times of India, 23 June 
1996. 
47 Author’s interview with the Late Moulvi Iftekhar, a noted Shia political leader and a 
member of the Farooq Abdullah cabinet, in June 1995 in New Delhi. 
48 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, ‘Return of Migrants: Interim Report of Sub-
Committee,’ Srinagar, 24 July 1997. According to the report, the estimated number of 
Hindu migrant families was 50,000. The number of structures gutted/damaged was around 
18,400 of which 4,862 houses were totally gutted. See p. 8 of the report. 
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Indian state of Punjab then was witnessing. Following the Operation Blue Star at 
the Golden Temple of Amritsar in 1984 there was large-scale disaffection among 
the Sikhs, which often resulted in indiscriminate arrest of Sikh youths by the 
Punjab police for interrogation and other kinds of unauthorized torture. Pakistan 
took advantage of the situation and made room for the reception of these 
disaffected youth on its soil for their training in armed rebellion against the Indian 
state. These trainings became part of a wider operation run by Pakistan’s 
intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), primarily meant for the 
training of the Afghan mujahedeens (freedom fighters). 
 It was almost during the same time that Kashmir politics witnessed tremors of 
sorts. The NC of Kashmir and the Congress at the centre for their narrow political 
interests and on wrong political calculations did not allow the Muslim United Front 
(MUF) to have their rightful share of seats in the state assembly by rigging the 
elections that were held in 1987. Having lost faith in the democratic system many 
of the members of the MUF gradually were lured to extra-constitutional means to 
express their grievances. It was against this background that international Islam 
also started playing its role in a bigger way. Large-scale contributions poured in 
from Saudi Arabia and other Islam conscious countries like Iran to both Sunni and 
Shia religious organizations and political parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami for 
opening up schools to teach children Arabic, Persian and Urdu and train them in 
Islamic values. By 1990 there were more than hundred such schools, which had 
produced about 150,000 students trained in orthodox Islamic values. The two 
trends in Kashmir, namely, political disaffection of the Kashmiri youth with the 
system, and a growing involvement of international Islam in the socio-political life 
of the state, got intricately mixed. As a result, the political movement in Kashmir 
assumed an Islamic character replacing the secular Kashmiriyat. The temptation for 
Pakistan to settle its score with India for the latter’s role in the creation of 
Bangladesh became irresistible. 
 Increasingly, terrorism in Kashmir got internationalized which was evident 
from the sophistication of the operations, the undrying source of their funding and 
the actual arrest of terrorists belonging to other nationalities by the Indian security 
forces. The U.S.-based human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, which 
was ever critical of the Indian state for its human rights record in Kashmir, noted in 
its 1995 report that ‘kidnappings, indiscriminate use of explosives, including car 
and letter bombs, in which the civilians were the principal victims, appeared to be 
the work of Islamic groups whose leadership included Afghans and other non-
Kashmiris….49 Even some Chechnian rebels were killed in encounters.50 Following 
the Taliban’s victory in Kabul there was clear evidence of the involvement of 
Afghan Islamists in Kashmir. An expatriate Pakistani journalist puts it aptly: ‘In 
Kashmir we originally had a freedom movement against Indian occupation. This 
struggle for self-determination was hijacked by Islamists who turned it into a Jihad. 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have many faces: organizations such as Lashkar-e-
Tayba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Sepah-e-Sahaba etc. These 
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groups disappear only to appear in another form and under a new name. Pakistani 
Islamists are convinced that Al-Qaeda will remerge in Kashmir.’51 Incidentally, the 
Valley observed a strike in the last week of September 2001 in support of Osama 
bin Laden although the APHC had just passed a resolution supporting Pervez 
Musharraf’s stand against Al Qaeda.52 
 
ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The alleged human rights violations in the valley by the Indian security forces have 
always been on the international agenda. If the Indian state is obliged to deal with 
the problem of militancy in the state with all the power at its disposal, then some 
violations of human rights at times are inevitably to happen. But that is no excuse. 
Several Indian and international human rights organizations are seized with the 
issue. According to official Indian count, between 1990 and 1996, about 25,000 
people were killed in the valley two-thirds of whom were killed by the Indian 
security forces. Kashmiris put the figure at 50,000.53 Even the High Court orders 
on habeas corpus petitions were allegedly flouted.54 Earlier, even the Amnesty 
International was not permitted to visit the valley as in the Government of India’s 
reckoning the organization followed a ‘political agenda.’55 But then the former 
chairman of the National Human Rights Commission of India, Ranganath Misra, 
wrote to the then Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, to allow the Amnesty to 
visit Kashmir. To allay the apprehension of the government he suggested that the 
members of the Commission would accompany the AI so that ‘we can guarantee 
that facts are reported correctly.’56 The Government of J&K has set up a State 
Human Rights Commission. The Amnesty International and foreign journalists are 
now allowed to freely report on Kashmir by visiting the valley. 
 During the last two-three years some glaring human rights violations were 
recorded. According to a press report, by early 2001 there were as many as 2,174 
cases of missing people from the custody of security forces and the police in the 
state. Of this, only 76 cases were registered and one among them prosecuted.57 On 
9 March 2001, the Kashmir Times began serializing a report on ‘Human Rights 
Violations in Jammu and Kashmir,’ written by Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy of 
Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University on behalf of a working group on Kashmir 
comprising, besides he himself, Ambrose Pinto and Zafar Iqbal Manhas. The group 
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was set up at the behest of the Kashmir Foundation for Peace and Development 
Studies, Srinagar. In September 2001 the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties 
Committee, Human Rights Forum, Organisation for Protection of Democratic 
Rights, People’s Democratic Forum and the People’s Union for Democratic Rights 
(PUDR) published a 60-page report, Grim Realities of Life, Death and Survival in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The report was based on inquiries by an 11-member team, 
which undertook a tour of the state from 22 to 31 May 2001. It documented the sad 
plight of the state’s human rights commission and documented cases of vengeance 
killings by the security forces, their use of human shields, rape and molestation of 
women, custodial killings, fake encounters and torture.58 According to figures 
supplied by the APHC, which must be taken with a pinch of salt, the total number 
of civilians killed between October 1996 and August 2001 were 7,990. Of these, 
1,070 were allegedly killed in custody. Besides, there were 3,098 houses burnt or 
blasted and 302 raped. All these figures totalled up to 75 per cent more than the 
official estimates for the same period. The AI put the total number of disappeared 
at 1,100.59 
In 2002, all conscientious Indians were shocked by the Chittsinghpura DNA 
case goof-up. The event tells us what all can be possible in the convoluted milieu 
of Kashmir. Following the Chittsinghpora massacre of some Sikhs in Kashmir’s 
Anantnag district, in a joint police-army operation in March 2000 five allegedly 
Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists were killed. But the local Muslim community alleged 
that the killed persons were their relatives who had nothing to do with the Lashkar. 
When the protests mounted, under growing public pressure the J&K government 
ordered for the exhumation of the bodies for the DNA test. The idea was to prove 
once for all that they were Lashkar men and not local youths. But when exhumed, 
five families identified the charred and decomposed bodies as those of their 
relatives who had gone missing after the Chittsinghpora incident. The J&K 
government, however, insisted, and rightly so, that no action would be taken 
against the security personnel until DNA testing conclusively proved the identity of 
the five bodies. Following this the DNA samples were collected from the bodies 
and from their eight relatives and sent in April 2000 to the Centre for DNA 
Fingerprinting and Diagnostics, Hyderabad, an autonomous institute under the 
Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India. To ensure that 
the tests would prove negative, the officials apparently tampered with the relatives’ 
DNA samples. Naturally the samples did not match but they exposed a massive 
cover-up operation in which even the samples taken from females were submitted 
as those of men.60 
 It is the violation of human rights in the valley by the Indian state that figures 
prominently in an average Pakistani’s mind. The fact that the victims of these 
violations happen to be Muslims establishes an emotional chord with the people of 
Kashmir. The following is a representative sample of such sentiments: 
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India has launched a ruthless campaign of terror and repression 
against the people of Kashmir who are fighting for the right of self-
determination. Equipped with massive arbitrary powers to use lethal 
force and granted protection from persecution, the Indian army and 
para-military forces have been indulging in massive human rights 
abuses in the occupied Kashmir…. The number of Indian troops 
operating in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was 150,000 in 
1990, has now shot up to 600,000…. Kashmir has acquired the 
distinction of having heaviest deployment of troops in the world, the 
ratio being one soldier to every three Kashmiris.61 
 
The Government of Pakistan finds it easy to exploit such popular sentiments to 
further its designs in Kashmir. 
 
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE AND INDO-PAK DIVIDE 
 
After the restoration of the political process in Kashmir following the assembly 
elections of September 1996 there was an anxiety amongst the Indian security 
forces that by taking advantage of the lull in the situation the ISI might suddenly 
gear up its activities to topple the regime to bring the situation back to square one. 
It was for this reason that they were opposed to the revival of the Mughal Road, 
which was supposed to open up the much-needed all-season alternative route to the 
Kashmir valley. The existing Jammu-Srinagar highway is often closed to traffic in 
winter on account of snow and landslides. But since the new road would have 
passed through areas too close to the Line of Control it was opposed. 
 In spite of serious disagreement, India and Pakistan did sit across the table a 
number of times to discuss Kashmir. The major point of disagreement that came in 
the way of useful dialogue, however, was that while India agreed to discuss all 
outstanding issues including Kashmir, Pakistan insisted that it should be Kashmir 
first and all other issues later. It was Pakistan’s fear that under the garb of all issues 
India always diluted the primacy of the Kashmir question. The recent phase of 
discussion, which can be traced to March 1997 when the two sides met at the 
Foreign Secretaries level after a lapse of more than three years underlined the same 
dichotomy. By the end of 1997 three more meetings took place but the result was 
nil. The conferees essentially fought over modalities of talk only and not on the 
substantive issue of Kashmir. A Japanese scholar aptly characterized the 
relationship between the two countries as having graduated from ‘cool’ to ‘cold’.62 
 In May 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted several nuclear tests and in 
effect formally declared themselves as nuclear powers. For Kashmir issue per se 
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this development had little meaning but it shook the world community according to 
which Kashmir being the flash point the danger was now of a nuclear showdown. 
The process of dialogue between India and Pakistan continued and it seemed India 
was in a conciliatory mood. Informally it agreed to prioritise the agenda, the so-
called ‘2+6’. The two issues were: (1) peace and security, including confidence 
building measures, and (2) Jammu and Kashmir. The other six issues were: (1) 
Siachin, (2) Wullar barrage project and Tulbul navigation project, (3) Sir Creek, (4) 
terrorism and drug trafficking, (5) economic and commercial cooperation, and (6) 
promotion of friendly exchanges at various fields. The Lahore Declaration of 21 
February 1999 underwrote this mechanism. But even before the ink of the 
declaration could dry Pakistan unleashed its Kargil adventure in May 1999 
resulting in an armed confrontation between the two countries. 
 It is difficult to explain why Pakistan went for this adventure when things were 
improving beyond imagination. Did Nawaz Sharif know about the Kargil plan 
when he met Vajpayee? Or, is it that the army kept him in dark about the adventure 
to torpedo the peace process which was not going to help the army any way? It is 
true that the armed forces were kept off the peace process. In a way, therefore, the 
Kargil adventure was essentially a part of the power struggle between Sharif and 
the army. For India the writings on the wall were clear—so long as the army called 
the shots in Pakistan’s politics there could not be a negotiated settlement of the 
Kashmir issue. The raison d’être of the Pakistan army was Pakistan’s enmity with 
India at the core of which was Kashmir. As such, any solution of the problem 
would rob it of its pre-eminence in the country’s life. 
 But army’s political power being the reality of Pakistan India had to eventually 
reconcile itself to dealing with Pervez Musharraf. It was only by the beginning of 
2001, more than a year after Musharraf took over in October 1999 that Vajpayee 
showed his willingness to invite the general to India to discuss matters of mutual 
concern. In July 2001, a summit took place in the historic Indian city of Agra but 
nothing really came out of it. It was already clear that gap between to two countries 
was on the predictable line as Musharraf harped on the centrality of Kashmir, 
which he said was not addressed by the Lahore Declaration.63 Following the failure 
of the Agra summit India’s position gradually hardened. The issue became now 
that in any talk with Pakistan the first item on the agenda would be cross-border 
terrorism followed by Kashmir. For Pakistan it was the other way round. When the 
two nations were caught in this quagmire, the momentous event of nine-eleven 
shook the world. For India it provided an opportunity to let the world know that 
what India had been saying for years meant enormous sense. Jehadi terrorism was a 
global threat in which Kashmir was one of its major theatres. India’s advantage 
was to Pakistan’s disadvantage. It was under tremendous pressure from the United 
States to mend its ways and come out with concrete policies to leash the jehadis on 
its soil. In the meantime terrorist activities went unabated in Kashmir and on 13 
December 2001 the most sensational attack on the parliament of India took place. 
India raised its noise level and as a result international pressure on Musharraf 
further mounted. On 12 January 2002 the general delivered his historic address to 
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the nation in which he promised to tackle the problem of Islamic fundamentalism 
with an iron hand and did indeed took some effective steps. But on the Indian 
charge of cross-border terrorism there was no clear-cut commitment, nor was there 
any let up in the rhetoric about Kashmir. He even ridiculed the expression ‘cross-
border’. In an interview to The Hindu on 31 March 2002, he claimed to have made 
it clear to Vajpayee that ‘there is nothing going on across the border and it is not a 
border, it is a line of control and there is no terrorism, there is a freedom struggle 
going on there.’64 
 Out of exasperation and taking advantage of the post nine-eleven mood India 
decided to escalate the tension by amassing its forces along the Indo-Pak border so 
as to draw the global attention to the problem that terrorism in Kashmir posed and 
that it could not be tolerated any more. As expected, global concern went out of 
bounds and there was a flurry of diplomatic activities between New Delhi and 
Washington on the one hand and between Islamabad and Washington on the other. 
Other Western countries too contributed to the process to thwart any outbreak of 
war. It is needless to say that the fear of a nuclear war was in the back of 
everybody’s mind. The concern was not only about the death and destruction 
caused by any such showdown, however limited, the real anxiety was that it could 
hit at the core of non-proliferation and at the unwritten commitment of all nuclear 
nations not to use the weapon. One Indian nuclear scientist by drawing America’s 
own conceptual failure in this regard—he referred to the Pentagon’s ‘Nuclear 
Posture Review’ document—wondered whether the psychological barrier thus 
broken could ever be rebuilt. He wrote: 
 
In India tactical nuclear artillery has presumably not yet been 
assembled let alone deployed, despite the inclusion of sub-kiloton 
devices in the Pokhran tests. Now is the time to firmly oppose their 
production, no matter how strong the military argument for their use 
in the battlefield. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine declares a No-First-Use 
policy and claims that the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to 
deter the other side by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage. 
Such deterrence does not require battlefield nuclear weapons… It is 
best not to cross the Lakshman Rekha separating nuclear weapons 
from conventional arms. Whatever military advantage tactical sub-
kiloton weapons may offer, it is not worth the price of destroying the 
time-tested psychological barrier blocking the road to nuclear 
holocaust.65 
 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
From available evidence it appears that if a situation can be created when the 
Pakistanis are made to agree to the LOC as the formal border between India and 
Pakistan in Kashmir all concerned foreign powers would put their stamps of 
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acceptance. While the U.S. approval to this situation is more or less clear from 
their diplomatic posturing during the Kargil conflict, and much more so after the 
nine-eleven, there were earlier evidences too to this effect. It was as early as in 
1963 that a memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council 
Staff to President John F. Kennedy, dated 26 January 1963, noted: ‘We simply 
doubt Indians would ever give up the Vale… Therefore, we’ve worked out a 
partition scheme which we’re prepared to throw into the breach if talks seem about 
to break down. It is quite pro-Indian.’66 
 Viewed from the point of view of international security, the question of 
Kashmir could not be viewed in isolation nor could it remain a matter of merely 
India and Pakistan’s concern. Its proximity to Afghanistan, which is the gateway to 
Central Asian republics in which both India and Pakistan had economic stakes 
particularly in tapping their natural gas made it a volatile region. Since any 
escalation of tension there could bring in many other interested parties into the fray 
the guardians of international security could ill afford indifference to the region. It 
is against this background that the plebiscite formula lost its shine. It did not evoke 
much interest in the international community. Most of the countries expressed their 
hope that the problem of Kashmir could be solved as per the provisions of the 
Simla Agreement, which meant that the LOC should not be violated and other 
details could be worked out through peaceful negotiations. China was particularly 
disinterested in the plebiscite for it would have raked up its border dispute with 
India, which it was not keen to pursue given its policy of normalization of relations 
with India. Conceptually, China’s position on the theory of self-determination was 
that it was a ‘fraudulent measure being used by the developed nations to intervene 
improperly in the affairs of other countries.’67 Obviously, the theory applied to 
Kashmir as well. During his visit to Pakistan in December 1996 the Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin expressed his country’s preference for a ‘temporary 
shelving’ of the Kashmir issue. He gave vent to the Chinese thinking by proposing 
a ‘proper handling’ of the ‘existing disputes’ in a ‘spirit of seeking common ground 
while setting aside differences.’68 
 The United States, which amongst the external powers mattered the most, was 
also in favour of a bilateral settlement through talks. Without compromising on its 
established position that Kashmir was a disputed territory and with keeping in view 
its economic and strategic interests in the region, in which both India and Pakistan 
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figured prominently, the position of the U.S. government was that both the 
countries should settle the dispute amicably for there was the possibility of its 
escalation into a nuclear confrontation. Also in the back of its mind was the fact 
that more the tension grew between India and Pakistan the Sino-Pak alliance would 
be strengthened to the detriment of overall American interest in the region. Its 
policy, therefore, was one of blow hot blow cold so as to keep both India and 
Pakistan in good humour by making conciliatory gestures to them alternatively. 
 There was, however, one important element in the U.S. policy, which should 
not be overlooked. It viewed the people of Kashmir as a party to the ultimate 
dialogue and resolution of the conflict. Expressing his satisfaction with the 
parliamentary elections in J&K in June 1996, Frank Wisner, the then U.S. 
ambassador to India, said in an address delivered on 10 July 1996 at Pakistan’s 
Command and Staff College in Quetta: ‘No effort to end the conflict in the State 
will succeed until all concerned acknowledge that after nearly 50 years, there are 
certain fundamental realities that will not be changed. Acceptance of reality as it 
exists may provide a useful point of departure when serious discussion of the 
State’s future begins, at the governmental level between India and Pakistan, and in 
talks between the Indian government and Kashmiri interlocutors, and one day 
between Kashmiris. No thoughtful Indian I speak with argues that the reality of 
partition should be ignored or reversed.’69 The United States did not subscribe to 
either a plebiscite solution to the problem, nor the one through an international 
conference, which Pakistan had suggested.70 Like the United States, other Western 
nations were also for a dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve the 
dispute.71 
 Following the nine-eleven and the brinkmanship between India and Pakistan 
thereafter the United States was in a critical dilemma. It put considerable amount of 
pressure on Musharraf to leash the jehadis on the Pakistani soil but could not make 
India sufficiently happy. While India argued that Pakistan was giving only lip 
service, America felt that Musharraf strategy at home needed more time to show 
results. So far as the fate of Kashmir was concerned the expectations of India and 
Pakistan from the United States were diametrically opposite. Pakistan, having 
failed to change the objective reality in Kashmir ever since 1947, was happy that 
time probably had come to internationalise the issue under the American auspices. 
Moreover, it knew that making promises was one thing but to implement them was 
another. A poll conducted by the famous Pakistani newsmagazine Herald in 
January 2002 revealed that the support for jehad in Kashmir was widespread. 
Although only 4 per cent found Kashmir as a ‘pressing problem’ compared to 
unemployment, chances of Indo-Pak war, inflation, and poverty, which accounted 
for 31, 21, 15 and 9 per cent, respectively, as many as 64 cent of the respondents 
supported jehad in Kashmir in response to a pointed question.72 For India the time 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 12 July 1996. 
70 Ibid., 6 October 1996. 
71 Sundeep Waslekar, ‘Changing Western Perceptions of Kashmir,’ Mainstream (New 
Delhi), 34(44), 5 October 1996, pp. 15-16. See also Asian Age, 27 July and 25 October 
1996. 
72 The details of the poll were published in Times of India, 17 February 2002. 
 
                    PARTHA S. GHOSH 27 
was in its favour to put an end to Pakistan’s adventurism in Kashmir and would not 
have minded if America could put a stamp of legitimacy to the LOC as the de jure 
border between the two states in Kashmir. But it did not welcome the idea that 
America and Britain were considering putting international armed monitors on the 
LOC to maintain its sanctity. It explained that the terrain was too difficult for them 
to grapple with and only Indians and Pakistanis could do that.73 In effect it meant 
that India would not allow any extra-regional power to interfere with its age-old 
security doctrine.74 
 
WORLD MUSLIM OPINION 
 
So far as the global Muslim reaction to the Kashmir dispute was concerned it could 
be divided into four components although there was a popular belief among many 
that on every dispute having an ‘Islamic’ content there was a monolithic Muslim 
response. These components were—the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 
Muslim states in general, Muslim states of South Asia and the Islamic movements. 
The OIC has a membership of 51 members of which Uganda is a Muslim minority 
state. At one point India was invited to participate in the OIC deliberations but due 
to Pakistan’s opposition it could not do so. Two of OIC members, Turkey and 
Senegal, though Muslim majority, are constitutionally secular. By Muslim states 
we mean those states, which are Muslim majority and declare themselves as 
Muslim states, but not necessarily as Islamic states. The examples are Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. In South Asia two states are Muslim 
states other than Pakistan, namely, Bangladesh and the Maldives. By Islamic 
movements we refer to such organizations as Ikhwan Brothers (Egypt), the Islamic 
Dawa Organization (Libya), the Salvation Front (Algeria), the Taliban 
(Afghanistan), the Al-Qaida (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and a host of militant 
organizations operating in several parts of the world, most notably in Kashmir, 
Chechnia, Central Asia, Europe and America. 
 The OIC’s position on Kashmir was one in tune with Pakistan, but limited only 
to passing resolutions. It mentioned about human rights violations by Indian 
security forces and about Kashmiris’ right to self-determination but often diluted 
its positions by referring to both UN resolutions and Simla Agreement at one go. 
Its commitment to the cause of Kashmir remained verbal and unlike the Palestinian 
cause no resources were ever allocated to promote it.75 So far as the Muslim states 
in general were concerned there was no uniform pattern. Some were supportive of 
the Pakistani view like Saudi Arabia and generally the countries belonging to the 
Gulf Cooperation Council while some were supportive of the Indian view like 
Syria and Algeria. Egypt maintained a neutral position and so did Iran, at least 
lately. According to one report published in 1996, 63.2 of the Indonesian business 
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leaders and 55.6 of their Malaysian counterparts, both Muslim majority countries, 
voted for Kashmir as part of India.76 The policies of the Muslim states kept 
changing depending upon the prevailing texture of their bilateral relationships with 
India and Pakistan, respectively. In South Asia, the Maldives is in general pro-
India while Bangladesh maintains cautious neutrality. Both plead for peaceful 
settlement of the dispute through bilateral negotiations. During the 52nd session of 
the UN Human Rights Commission held in Geneva in March 1996 Pakistan tried to 
convince the Muslim nations to move a resolution to condemn India for its human 
rights violations in Kashmir but it did not succeed.77 
 The Islamist movements are by and large pro-Pakistan and view the Kashmir 
problem as a Hindu-Muslim issue in which their natural sympathy lies with the 
Kashmiri Muslims. It is up to the latter to choose between Pakistan or an 
independent existence. There was, however, at least one exception to this rule. 
Adel Hussain, the Secretary-General of Al-Amal (Labour) Party of Egypt, which 
otherwise supported the cause of most militant Islamic movements in Egypt, 
argued that it would be strategically short-sighted to compare India with Israel. He 
was referring to a statement of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan. He suggested that the 
Islamists should work out an alliance with the Hindus and tap India’s technological 
know-how to deal with the West. He advocated a peaceful solution to the Kashmir 
problem within this framework.78 
 Among the expatriate Muslims mostly located in Britain and America it was 
not easy to gauge their reaction to the Kashmir problem. But in the aftermath of the 
MORI poll (discussed below) there was one such poll conducted by the Manchester 
Guardian and the ICM amongst the Muslim community of Britain. The latter had 
about two million Muslims of which 700,000 were of Pakistani origin, 300,000 of 
Bangladeshi origin, 240,000 of Indian origin and about 600,000 from various other 
countries. The poll results showed that of the 500 people interviewed, 34 per cent 
supported an independent status for J&K, and an equal number supported its 
merger with Pakistan. Seven per cent were undecided and two per cent voted for its 
remaining with India. Commenting on the poll, Shabir Choudhury, the head of the 
JKLF’s central diplomatic bureau, said that it confirmed the strong pro-
independence sentiment of the Kashmiris, which both India and Pakistan had been 
suppressing.79 
 
GAUGING THE KASHMIRI MOOD 
 
Although both India and Pakistan claim to have the majority support among 
Kashmir’s Muslims there is hardly any scientifically arrived means to corroborate 
these claims. India refers to the results of the parliamentary and assembly elections 
held in the state over the years in support of its claim. Pakistan can do that at an 
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even lesser scale insofar its part of J&K and the Northern Areas are concerned. 
India’s claim, however, becomes controversial since there is a widespread feeling 
that its elections are rigged to install that party only which is supposed to uphold 
J&K’s accession to the Indian Union. That means it is the NC. Any party of 
doubtful loyalty is either kept off the electoral process or is made to lose. 
 There are, however, indirect ways of feeling Kashmir’s political pulse. This is 
possible by measuring the level of popular participation in the elections held so far. 
Till 1972 it was virtually a one-party system in the valley as the NC ran 
uncontested. The general election held in 1971 for the first time assumed 
significance for Kashmir because in that election the Jammat-i-Islami decided to 
join the fray. In the assembly election of 1972 there was, therefore, a contest. The 
Jamaat participated particularly to tell the world that religion and politics could not 
be separated. Its performance was not great, though it won a few seats. In the 
aftermath of the election it alleged that the elections had been rigged. During the 
Emergency (1975-77) the Jamaat was banned, which was lifted after the Janata 
Party came to power in 1977.80 
 The 1977 elections were free and fair and there was a proper contest. The point 
to be noted is that in all the elections, up to 1987, allegations of rigging 
notwithstanding (barring 1977), turnout of voters was in the range of 60 to 70 per 
cent.81 But following the insurgency of 1989 it has dwindled to such an extent that 
it has lost its credibility to a large extent. In the latest 1999 general election, even 
Abdullah’s assembly constituency of Ganderbal registered only 10 per cent polling. 
The entire parliamentary constituency of Srinagar registered only 11 per cent of 
polling. Ever since the insurgency, the Election Commission of India has organized 
four elections in J&K, namely, 1996 parliamentary and assembly elections, 1998 
parliamentary election, and the 1999 parliamentary election, and in all of them it 
had to enlist the assistance of security forces and the surrendered-insurgents. Is it 
not in violation of the Election Commission’s own stance elsewhere where the 
presence of even police in large numbers had made it to declare the elections null 
and void?82 
 So far as the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is concerned the democratic record of 
Pakistan is even more skewed. It was only in 1970, 23 years after independence, 
that the so-called ‘Azad’ (liberated) Kashmir was granted adult franchise. Still, its 
political status remained unclear in normally understood constitutional terms. 
According to Section 56 of the 1974 constitution, the Pakistan government could 
dismiss any elected government in Azad Kashmir even if it commanded the 
majority in the provincial assembly. The status of the Northern Areas was even 
worse. It was granted adult franchise in as late as 1994. Till then the area had no 
                                                 
80 Yoginder Sikand, ‘The Emergence and Development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu 
and Kashmir (1940s-1990), Modern Asian Studies (London), 36(3), 2002, p. 742. 
81 Tremblay, ‘Kashmir Conflict,’ p. 573. 
82 In June 1981, the Chief Election Commissioner nullified the by-elections of two 
constituencies in Garhwal (then in U.P., now in Uttaranchal) on the ground that he had 
received reports from his officers that there were large presence of Haryana police there. 
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elected representative either in the local assembly or in the National Assembly.83 
But even after 1994 the political rights there are cosmetic. The Pakistani 
bureaucracy has the real power and the assembly is subordinate to it. The chief 
secretary, who is invariably a Punjabi or a Pathan, is all-powerful, and the chief 
executive of the Northern Area is the federal government’s Minister for Kashmir 
Affairs. According to Major Hussain Shah, a retired army officer who head the 
nationalist Muttahid Qaumi Party: ‘Nobody has loved Pakistan more than the 
people of Gilgit-Baltistan. But our rulers are tyrants. The East Pakistanis were the 
most patriotic Pakistanis but they were driven away. That is what is being done to 
us. I salute India. Even though a Kashmiri can become prime minister, no non-
Kashmiri can become chief minister of J&K. But in the Northern Areas, an 
outsider is our chief executive. In Pakistan they like to say Farooq Abdullah is a 
puppet chief minister. But Pakistan is not even prepared to let us be puppets.’84 
According to the editor of the Gilgit-based weekly, Naqqara, Ali Mardan, ‘if the 
government continues to ignore the grievances of the Northern Areas it could even 
end up facing an armed struggle.’85 
 Against this background, together with the relative lack of communication 
between J&K and the rest of the world because of the insurgency situation in the 
Indian part of the state and the Pakistani government’s reluctance to allow foreign 
visitors to travel to ‘Azad Kashmir’ and the Northern Areas, it is extremely 
difficult to gauge the popular sentiments there. It is only of late that a somewhat 
scientifically conducted poll has taken place in the Indian part of Kashmir the 
results of which tend to suggest that the broad sentiments prevailing in the valley 
are in favour of a peaceful settlement of the dispute through dialogue between 
India and Pakistan. 
 
THE MORI POLL 
 
The U.K.-based Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) conducted the 
poll at the behest of Lord Eric Avebury, a British human rights activist who has the 
record of supporting almost all separatist movements around the world including 
the one in Kashmir. The Facts Worldwide, an affiliate company of MORI, 
conducted the fieldwork in India between 20 and 28 April 2002. In all, 850 face-to-
face interviews were conducted with people aged 16+ across 55 localities within 
J&K. This comprised 22 locations in Jammu city, 20 in Srinagar city and 6 in the 
urban areas of Leh, as well as in 3 villages around Jammu and 4 villages around 
Srinagar. Quotas were set by gender, religion and locality, according to 1981 
census data for the region. A random selection procedure was used to select the 
individual respondents.86 
 For the purposes of this paper one should concentrate upon the opinion as was 
expressed in the valley, and not what was said in Jammu or Ladakh, although the 
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findings were not always segmented that way. From whatever one can cull from 
this perspective the findings would be as follows.87 
76 per cent were opposed to war between India and Pakistan to find a solution 
for the Kashmir problem. 
52 per cent believed that the correct way to bring about peace was through 
democratic elections. 
65 per cent believed that it was difficult to hold democratic elections as long as 
violence continued. 
More than 50 per cent agreed with the view that ‘a new political party was 
needed to bring about a permanent solution in Kashmir.’ (Manoj Joshi, a senior 
correspondent of the Times of India, wrote: ‘Support for the National Conference is 
at 18 per cent and for the Hurriyat at 22 per cent. The figures could be skewed 
because the polling was done in and around urban centres. The Congress with 29 
per cent of respondents’ support and Shabbir Shah’s J&K Democratic Freedom 
Party—16 per cent—displayed a surprising reservoir of strength. The Hizbul 
Mujahideen found favour with 11 per cent and the jehadi groups just 9 per cent 
support from the respondents.)88 
76 per cent believed that ‘the unique cultural identity of Jammu and Kashmir—
Kashmiriyat—should be preserved in any long-term solution. 
90 per cent believed that the border between the Indian part of Kashmir and the 
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir should be opened for trade and cultural exchanges. 
Over 90 per cent believed that the Indian security forces should scale down 
their operations in the valley to bring peace. 
64 per cent believed that there were widespread human rights violations by the 
security forces. 
A mere 2 per cent believed that the human rights violations by militant groups 
were widespread; 33 per cent believed that they were occasional. 
As noted above, as the MORI data were not stratified region-wise it was not 
possible to have a clear access to the political pulse of the valley. What one could 
infer from the above details was that there was no room for euphoria as a section of 
the Indian press seemed to reflect.89 Probably the circumspection shown by the 
Vajpayee administration was more in tune with the reality—it did not comment on 
the poll at all. On the negative side of the spectrum, so far as India was concerned, 
was the fact that people did not approve of the actions of the Indian security forces, 
that they did not have so much hatred for the militants, that they accepted anti-
India and pro-independence forces as legitimate political formations and that they 
were in favour of opening the border between the two Kashmirs. On the positive 
side was their disapproval of war as a means to settle the Kashmir problem and the 
resumption of true democratic process through free and fair elections allowing all 
political forces a fair chance to participate in the process. In essence the problem 
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was expected to remain where it was. The free and fair elections could not be 
possible without the participation of anti-India and pro-independence political 
forces and the latter could not participate because they would not swear by the 
Constitution of India, as per the statutory requirement. 
 
QUESTION OF NEUTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
 
In early 2002 the All Party Hurriyat Conference floated an interesting idea to 
identify the true representatives of the Kashmiri people in both the Kashmirs who 
could discuss the future of Kashmir in any future talks involving both India and 
Pakistan. It suggested that there should be a free three-stage election conducted by 
an independent commission consisting of six members. The two co-chairpersons of 
the commission would be Tapan Kumar Bose, an Indian national and the director 
of the Kathmandu-based South Asia Forum for Human Rights, and Sajjad Ali 
Shah, a former chief justice of Pakistan. The other four members were to be Ved 
Bhasin, editor of the Kashmir Times of Jammu, Zafar Mehdi, a faculty member of 
the Kashmir University in Srinagar, Sadiq Wahid Raja, a Ph. D. candidate from the 
Harvard University, and Khurshid, a retired judge from the POK. The first stage of 
the election would be held in the valley, second in Jammu and Ladakh and the third 
in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The elections were supposed to be held under 
international supervision.90 Expectedly, neither India nor Pakistan found the idea 
worth considering for it indirectly suggested the possibility of creating an 
independent Kashmir. The Indian press grossly misunderstood it as if the J&K 
assembly elections were being suggested under this independent commission. Even 
Farooq Abdullah and Omar Abdullah ridiculed it for denigrating the Election 
Commission of India. One could quarrel with the nitty-gritty of the mechanism 
suggested, but it was certainly not ‘outlandish’ as even a liberal newspaper like The 
Hindu characterized.91 One could argue, as one human rights activist and Kashmir 
watcher did: 
Already this move has received endorsement from the HM [Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen], as well as leaders like Shabir Shah. In contrast the jehadis as well as 
National Conference and other pro-Indian formations are opposing this. India’s 
Election Commission which may have conducted fair elections elsewhere has 
besmirched its reputation in J and K (and Nagaland) by getting carried away by 
‘national interest’ considerations and repeatedly legitimising rigged elections. 
Therefore, any attempt to crush this autonomous election carries risks for the 
Indian government since it would pit a democratic manifestation by a people 
against a government’s militaristic policy. This is the strongest evidence of a 
change at the ground level, which places politics over the gun, and self-
determination over the moth-eaten autonomy/plebiscite paradigm.92 
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PREPARING FOR THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS OF 2002 
 
The end of the five-year term of the J&K assembly elected in September 1996 
warrants an election in September 2002 at the earliest. Considering the fact that 
much would depend on its outcome provided all democratic forces join the process 
Vajpayee promised a free and fair election, which in a way suggested that the 
earlier ones were of relatively less credence. There were two major challenges for 
the government, one administrative and the other political. The administrative 
challenge included the massive task of revising the electoral rolls and the issue of 
photo identity cards to the voters to prevent bogus voting, both of which were time 
consuming affairs. The political challenge primarily was how to convince forces 
opposed to Farooq Abdullah, most notably the Hurriyat Conference, to join the 
fray. Though some of the rebel leaders of the Hurriyat were willing to join the 
process the mainstream Hurriyat refused to oblige. There was some hope that since 
Farooq Abdullah had passed on his mantle to his son and he himself might join the 
centre resulting in his absence from the state scene it could encourage his 
opponents to reconsider their premises. But the assassination of Abdul Gani Lone 
in May 2002 complicated the scene. Lone was known to be a moderate within the 
Hurriyat fold and some analysts suggested that the killing was done by the 
hardliners, probably with Pakistan’s prodding, to discourage anybody to participate 
in the election. Government of India probably convinced itself with this line of 
thinking and on 9 June 2002 arrested the former Hurriyat chairman, Syed Ali Shah 
Geelani, a known hardliner and the leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, to mean that it 
meant business. Soon after his arrest, Geelani’s multiple links with the ISI were 
flashed. The problem, however, remained. If the elections were held without the 
participation of political forces opposed to the National Conference the electoral 
verdict would not have much political meaning. 
 
CONCLUSION: LOC, THE SOLUTION 
 
Given the intractability of the problem and the practical difficulties in organizing a 
plebiscite it seems that sooner India and Pakistan agreed to declare LOC as the de 
jure border between them in Kashmir the better for all. Otherwise the mud would 
be even more stirred and increasingly the Indian position would be hardened in 
favour of recovery of the POK. There were straws in the wind pointing to that 
direction. A statement of the Ministry of External Affairs declared: ‘The State of 
Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union. The only issue 
concerning Pakistan, with regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, related to the 
vacation of Pakistan from those areas of the State, which are under its illegal and 
forcible occupation. India is committed to the resolution of this issue in accordance 
with the Simla Agreement.’93 After the Kargil war India’s posture hardened and 
other than Farooq Abdullah no one talked any more of agreeing to the LOC as a de 
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jure border. Even Farooq Abdullah talked with a forked tongue by asking India to 
cross over the LOC to destroy the terrorist camps there. 
 Notwithstanding such evidences about India’s hardening posture about the 
POK it could be argued that India might not be averse to the formal declaration of 
the LOC as a permanent international border between the two neighbours. We have 
noted above that it was as early as the early fifties that India had virtually 
reconciled itself to the division of Kashmir along the line of actual control there 
when it agreed to the Constitution of J&K, which was meant for the Indian part of 
J&K only. During the Simla negotiations, according to P.N. Dhar, who was in the 
Indian delegation, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani Prime Minister, had 
informally agreed to Indira Gandhi’s suggestion to declare the LOC as the 
international border but he needed time to convince his countrymen and that is why 
it could not be so included in the agreement.94 Dhar’s Pakistani counterparts, 
however, refuted this view.95 Moreover, as we have noted above, immediately after 
returning to Pakistan Bhutto clarified that there was no dilution of Pakistan’s 
avowed Kashmir policy. In the want of Indian and Pakistani archival documents on 
the subject the debate has to be frozen there. 
 During Rajiv Gandhi’s time also there seemed to be willingness on the part of 
India to recognize the LOC as the de jure border and probably Pakistan too was in 
a mood to agree. Barbara Crossette, an American correspondent who happened to 
be with Rajiv Gandhi hours before he was assassinated, quoted the Indian leader as 
saying: ‘But I know who could have solved these problems with us—General Zia. 
We were close to finalizing agreement on Kashmir, we had the maps and 
everything was ready to sign. And then he [Zia] was killed.96 
 Besides accepting the LOC as the de jure border what is also needed is to 
demarcate the boundary on the Siachin glacier. The present LOC terminates at the 
point NJ 9842 on the Soltore ridge. This is essentially the old ceasefire line as 
agreed upon in Karachi in 1949 and was never defined northwards beyond NJ 
9842. The Siachin problem was virtually solved during Rajiv Gandhi’s time but 
probably considering its negative impact on Congress votes in the 1989 elections 
he became lukewarm.97  
 Other than the LOC solution no concrete idea has ever emerged.98 The idea of 
an undivided, independent and neutralized Kashmir is not a feasible solution. So is 
the idea of giving the valley to Pakistan on a platter. No Indian government worth 
its salt can afford to do that. I wish it could, for that would have led to the demise 
of Pakistan army’s pre-eminence in Pakistan’s political life, which India always 
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wanted. But to think in such long-term perspective one needs statesmen, not 
politicians, which unfortunately few countries can boast of having, and India is no 
exception. In the given reality no option is available other than formalizing the 
LOC as the border. 
